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Corporate Financing and Anticipated Credit
Rating Downgrades
Abstract
Firm circumstances change but rating agencies may not make
timely revisions to their ratings, increasing information asymmetry
between rms and the market. We examine whether rms time the
securities market before a credit rating agency publicly reveals its de-
cision to downgrade a rms credit rating. Using quarterly data, we
show that rms adjust their nancing structures before credit rating
downgrades are publicly revealed. More specically, rms on average
increase their debt nancing by 1.29% before the disclosure of a rat-
ing downgrade, and we nd that this increase is due to the issuance
of debt rather than the repurchase of equity.
JEL classication: G24, G32
Keywords: Credit rating downgrades, Information asymmetry, Cap-
ital structure
1. Introduction
In this paper we explore the hypothesis that rms exploit information asym-
metry and adjust their nancing activities before information about a change
in their credit rating is publicly revealed. We show that rms facing down-
grades exploit their presently higher ratings by increasing their debt ratio.
Our research highlights the importance of credit ratings for rmsnancial
policies.
A change in the issuers credit rating reects a substantial change in the
long-term credit worthiness of the rm, and therefore is an important event.
This change assigns a di¤erent quantitative category, which may derive dis-
crete costs and benets of moving to a di¤erent rating level (Kisgen, 2006;
2009). It can result in adjustments in security prices (Hand, Holthausen,
and Leftwich, 1992; Kliger and Sarig, 2000) or a¤ect the rms access to the
external debt market (Kisgen, 2006).
Our study is motivated by evidence that rating agencies do not change
ratings in a timely manner to reect the up-to-date nancial condition of a
rm. The Association for Financial Professionals (AFP) conducted a survey
in 2002 and reported that most respondents do not believe changes in their
companys nances are promptly reected in the ratings, with the delay
often believed to be around six months.1
1Empirical studies have o¤ered some explanations for the observed delay in rating
changes. Altman and Rijken (2004) and Boot, Milbourn, and Schmeits (2006), among
others, report that rating agencies may grant issuers time to recover before taking rating
actions, and that rating agencies who pursue rating accuracy and stability to maintain
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One of the functions of credit ratings is to alleviate the already existing
information asymmetry between the rm and the outsiders. In this paper,
we argue that the di¤erence between the moment when the updated infor-
mation about the rms creditworthiness emerges internally and the moment
when a rating agency announces a change in credit rating creates a win-
dow of increased information asymmetry between the rm and investors.
This is because managers have rst-hand information about the rms nan-
cial circumstances, operating performance, growth opportunities and future
prospects, while investors may not have easy access to such up-to-date in-
formation. Moreover, rating agencies typically hold meetings with the rm
to gather information for analysis and then notify the rm on the rating
opinions preceding the publication and dissemination of the outcome.2
Our ratings data come from Standard and Poors and thus we use the
gure (Figure 1), from Standard and Poors to illustrate the information
transmission mechanism in their process.3 As shown in Figure 1, their process
suggests that the rating agency and the rm share common information sets
(in particular during stages 5 and 6). However, the rm might not be able to
have direct communications with the rating agency about the exact timing
for the release of the rating change information because the timing of the
their professional reputations do not revise credit ratings if the expected impact on credit
quality of an event is considered as being temporary, uncertain or reversible.
2For details and a diagram on the rating process, see:
http://www.standardandpoors.com/
aboutcreditratings/ RatingsManual_PrintGuide.html.
3https://www.spratings.com/about/about-credit-ratings/ratings-process.html
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release of information is up to the judgement of the rating agency.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Consequently, rmmanagers are able to foresee rating changes for the rm
in the near future with greater precision than investors, based on their better
knowledge of the rms nancial condition, their understandings about the
agencys rating criteria and their communications with the rating agency. We
term this asymmetry in information about future ratings as the information
gap. As such, periods before rating changes increase the information gap
between managers and investors. Intuitively, a rm may require additional
nancing in order to sustain operations when facing deteriorating nancial
conditions It is plausible that the rm raises more debt at the time of
becoming more likely to be downgraded. We model and test whether rms
exploit this information gap by increasing debt just before a downgrade. We
argue that rms have incentives to take actions in order to take advantage
of the overvalued debt when ratings are about to be downgraded.
We forecast the probability of a downgrade a quarter ahead using a logit
model that incorporates the present realizations of rm characteristics and
rm actions like increasing debt and/or equity, for a large sample of U.S.
industrial rms from 1985 to 2010. The rating forecast model incorporates
the quarter-end stock price, which reects investorsinformation of the rm
available to the market by the time of rm capital structure activities. In
utilizing such price information, we allow the exibility that investors are
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able to gather signals about the nancial health of the rm. This alleviates
the possibility of a downgrade due to increased debt of a rm a quarter
earlier4. It is not surprising that an increase in debt increases the probability
of long-term rating downgrade. Most importantly, we seek to understand
whether the rm possesses superior information not available to the public
about a future downgrade in the rms long-term credit rating. To this end,
we use the residual of the logit model as the information gap to capture the
superior information of the rm managers.
We then model the relation between the rms nancing adjustments
and the estimated information gap about a rating downgrade, controlling
for a set of conventional rm characteristics. This research design estimates
the information gap model and the nancing adjustment model together
as a simultaneous system. This further mitigates the potential problem of
simultaneity bias in the nancing change model that can be interpreted as
the possibility that the future downgrade is due to additional borrowing.
The use of quarterly data further reduces potential misinterpretation that
part of our ndings might be due to a credit rating agency rapidly responding
to capital structure adjustments. The typical delay in credit rating adjust-
ments of around six months reduces the probability that this change occurs
in the same or in the subsequent quarter of the capital structure change. In
addition, when changes in capital structure drive credit rating adjustments,
4Hand, et. al (1992) and Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) nds similar results after
rating downgrade.
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then we would expect similar e¤ects of debt issues and stock repurchases.
Our main nding is that the information gap signicantly a¤ects rms
nancing activities, particularly for speculative graded rms, at least one
quarter before the rating change takes place, and also in the same quarter of
the rating change. Firms that anticipate downgrades signicantly increase
debt nancing by 1.29%, but do not adjust their equity nancing.
In our sample, downgraded rms have lower liquidity than those non-
downgraded rms, on average, highlighting the nancial constraints of those
downgraded rms, which restrict their ability to deleverage before a down-
grade. In other words, rms that anticipate downgrades tend not to enjoy
a luxury choice of trying to cut debt to improve credit quality. Instead,
they raise more debt at the present time when debt is still relatively cheap
compared to the debt costs once a downgrade is realized. This suggests a
channel through which debt overvaluation occurs, which is not derived from
the information content already being released to the market but is due to
the late release of credit rating information.
The absence of equity changes, as shown in our Tables 1 and 4, is because
net equity issues are small for downgraded rms (while much larger for non-
downgraded rms). As a result, rms on average increase their debt ratio by
1.27% when they anticipate long-term credit rating downgrades in the next
quarter.
We relate to studies on credit ratings and capital structure. Most no-
tably, Kisgen (2006) nds that rms adjust their leverage to avoid credit
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rating downgrades. Issuing debt when it is not yet publicly known that the
rms credit rating will deteriorate is likely to exploit ine¢ ciencies in the mar-
ket and maximizes current shareholdersvalue. We focus on the rms that
are actually downgraded, and examine rmsactions before the information
about this downgrade is released.5
Overall, our ndings suggest that rms make nancing adjustments when
they have information about an upcoming credit rating downgrade that in-
vestors might not have. The important implication from our study for regula-
tors is that requiring prompt credit rating updates will reduce the information
advantage of managers and could benet new debt holders.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops our frame-
work of the information gap and our hypothesis. Section 3 presents the data
and sample. Sections 4 and 5 present the methodology and report the results.
Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2. A model of an information gap
Credit ratings are very important in nancial markets. This is not only be-
cause of the fact that ratings e¤ectively provide an entry ticket for rms
to enter into the debt market, but also that rating changes often lead to
adjustments in security prices (Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich, 1992), the
nancing costs of rms as well as the existing credit and debt agreements of
5Also related is Kisgen (2009), who examines rm behavior after a credit rating down-
grade is announced.
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the rm. Kliger and Sarig (2000) show that rmsdebt value increases (de-
creases) and equity value falls (rises) when realized ratings are better (worse)
than expected ratings. In addition, policy makers have drafted nancial reg-
ulations such as Sarbanes-Oxley Act with references to credit ratings, giving
rise to an endorsement value of ratings. Any information pointing toward a
future change in the credit rating of a rm is therefore crucial for the stake-
holders of the rm and may inuence the rms nancing decisions. Graham
and Harvey (2001), for example, report that 57.1% of CFOs see credit ratings
as important when they determine their rmscapital structure.
There is evidence that rms share and exchange information with rating
agencies. Kliger and Sarig (2000) argue that instead of revealing information
to the public, which may benet competitors, rms provide rating agencies
with detailed insider information during the rating process. Kisgen (2006)
states that rating agencies may receive signicant company information that
is not public. Similarly, rating agencies provide feedback to rms, as is shown
in Figure 1. Thus, we postulate that rmsprivate communications to rating
agencies may allow them to better anticipate the likelihood of future rating
changes relative to the public. In our setup, a change in ratings, released as
public news by ratings agencies, occurs in quarter t+ 1.
In our framework there are two types of rms with regard to rating
changes in the next quarter: (i) bad rms who anticipate their ratings
to be downgraded, and (ii) otherswho anticipate their ratings either to be
upgraded or to remain unchanged. We use the otherscategory as a baseline
7
in our test. Both types of rms, badand others, face possible delays in
information arrival about a change in ratings. We specify a model in which a
rating agency will announce at time t+1 a downgrade in the rating of a bad
rm i. Let IDi;t+1 be the indicator of the downgrade event which takes a value
of 1 when the downgrade arrives, and zero otherwise. In our framework, any
market participant or investor other than the rms managers and the rating
agencies only have access to publicly available information at time t.
Dene Xi;t as the information that is publicly available about rm i in-
cluding any publicly observable action taken by the rm that might a¤ect
the downgrade event at time t. After observing the action, the investors can
infer the potential consequences of such an action on IDi;t+1. The downgrade
event also depends on the set Zt, which is the information privately available
to the rm and the rating agency at time t.
Let ID (Xi;t; Zi;t) be the function of a downgrade for rm i at time t based
on the information sets Xi;t and Zi;t. Let dt = 1 indicate the rating agencys
decision with probability  to announce the outcome from the indicator func-
tion ID (Xi;t; Zi;t) at time t+1 rather than at t; else with probability 1  for
dt = 0 that the rating agency decides to announce at time t. In other words,
the probability of delaying the agencys assessment outcome to the public is
. Therefore, when the rating agency decides not to reveal the downgrade
information until t + 1; the public observes this downgrade event as IDi;t+1
only until time t+ 1; but not at t:
Thus, the downgrade decision from the rating agency observed by the
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public is:
IDi;t+1 = dtIDt (Xi;t; Zi;t) (1)
where IDi;t+1 is the observed downgrade event at t+1 on rm i, and ID (Xi;t; Zi;t)
is the assessment outcome of the downgrade function for rm i at time t:6
Equation (1) shows the equivalence between a delay and the event of no
downgrade. Thus the investor has to predict the event without full knowl-
edge of the rms a¤airs (Zi;t), whereas the manager only needs to predict
the delay by the rating agency.
For the investor without the knowledge of Zt; her expectation at time t
of a downgrade at time t+ 1 in the rating of rm i is:
Et
IDt+1Xi;t = E dtE IDt (Xi;t; Zi;t)Xi;t
= E

IDt (Xi;t; Zi;t)
Xi;t
 bIDt+1 (Xi;t)
Similarly, for the manager of rm i who has the knowledge of Xt and Zt; the
expectation of a rating downgrade is:
Et
IDt+1Xi;t; Zi;t = ID (Xi;t; Zi;t)
6According to the model, when there is no delay in the rating agencys rating announce-
ment, i.e.,  = 0 such that with 100% probability dt = 0; then at time t+ 1 the indicator
IUi;t+1 of the upgrade event takes a value of zero. The observed rating change therefore
occurs in the same period as soon as the indicator function gives its assessment outcome.
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The information gap between the rm manager and the investor for a rating
downgrade for rm i is therefore:
Et
IDt+1Xt; Zt  Et IDt+1Xi;t =  hID (Xt; Zt)  bIDt+1 (Xi;t)i
 GDi;t+1:
2.1. An empirical model of an information gap
In order to capture the expectation in rating changes of the outsiderswho
use public information, we use a logit model to capture the likelihood of a
downgrade (as in IDt ) in the next period based on the information available
in the current period. Specically, we construct indicator LTDDi;t+1 for a
downgrade, on the long-term debt rating for rm i in quarter t+ 1 as:
LTDDi;t+1 =
8><>: 1; SPLT i;t+1 < SPLT i;t0; otherwise (2)
where SPLT i;t and SPLT i;t+1 are, respectively, the Compustat data items
for the S&P domestic long-term issuer credit rating for rm i at quarters t
and t + 1. S&P long term credit rating reects Standard & Poors view of
the obligors capacity and willingness to meet its long-term nancial com-
mitments.
It is important to note that there is a distinct di¤erence between our
downgrade indicators and those of Kisgen (2006). Kisgen (2006) denes rms
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being rated with a +at the beginning of the year as an upgrade indicator
and rms being rated with a -as a downgrade indicator. An alternative
indicator may be the so called CreditWatch announced by rating agencies,
which is a qualitative opinion about the rms prospect. However, according
to Standard and Poors, CreditWatch is not intended to include all ratings
under review, and rating changes may occur without the ratings having rst
appeared on CreditWatch.7
In our study, we look at the actual change in ratings from quarter t to
t + 1. We consider this a realistic classication of the direction of rating
changes for our purposes.8
Thus the downgrade decision from the rating agency is based on decision
model:
LTDDi;t+1 = IDi;t+1 = dtID(Xi;t; Zi;t) (3)
where Xi;t is a vector of observable state variables and rm actions that
captures the changes to capital structure of the rm, and Zi;t is a vector of
unobserved decision variables.
Since only Xi;t is observed by the public, the logit model is estimated by
the public as:
E(LTDDi;t+1
Xi;t) = exp(X 0i;t)
1 + exp(X 0i;t)
: (4)
Specically, we regress the downgrade outcome LTDDi;t+1 on the state
7See, page 8 on http://www.standardandpoors.com/spf/general/RatingsDirect_Commentary_979212_06_22_2012_12_42_54.pdf
8For example, when the US and UK government bond ratings were moved from AAA
to AA+, the plusstatus does not mean that they are now more likely to be upgraded in
the near future. Instead, they were considered as a downgrade by the market.
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variables: Leveragei;t, Profiti;t, Sizei;t, Pricei;t, and Liquidityi;t (see also
Ederington and Yawitz, 1986), controlling for both the industry and quarter
xed e¤ects. It is plausible that when rms increase their leverage (4deti;t)
or decrease their equity (4eqti;t) through share repurchase, the likelihood of
a downgrade increases. The changes in capital structure 4deti;t; 4eqti;t in
equation 3 are publicly observable. Thus, our framework accommodates the
ability of outside investors of observing4deti;t; 4eqti;t, and hence being able
to predict the possibility of a downgrade in the next period.
Having estimated equation 3, we obtain the forecasted probability (also
see the Appendix) of rating downgrades [LTD
D
i;t+1 for rm i in quarter t+ 1
as dened below:
[LTD
D
i;t+1 = Prob
 
LTDDi;t+1 = 1
Xi;t (5)
We use the rare events small sample bias correction method of King and Zeng
(2001) on our model, as the large majority of rm-quarters are not associated
with downgrades.
Next, we dene the gap between the realized rating change at time t+ 1
and the outsidersexpectation of a rating change based on public information
for an upgrade and a downgrade, respectively, as:
GLTDDi;t+1 = LTD
D
i;t+1  [LTD
D
i;t+1 (6)
which is a function of the unobserved variables Zi;t (see Cramer, 2005).
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In our framework, the managers have superior information relative to
the public, and the gap dened above captures the content of the superior
information reected in Zi;t, which is instrumented by the information gap.
We examine whether this residual private information has value and is related
to changes in capital structure.
2.2. Foreseeable downgrades and firm actions
Consider a rm that faces negative future prospects the current rating of
the rm may over evaluate its credit quality. A rating downgrade coming
late may thus grant opportunities for the rm to hold back the unfavorable
information from the outsiders, and allow a time window for the rm to
conduct nancing at relatively lower costs than the would-be cost level had
the unfavorable information being revealed without delay.
Formally, dene the market value of the rm at time t as:
Ait = Eit +Dit
where Eit and Dit are, respectively, the market values of equity and debt of
rm i at time t. A rating downgrade will lead to a reduction of the rm value
which will lower the market value of the rm to ADi;t+1 at time t+ 1 :
ADi;t+1  Ait + ID (Xit; Zit) Ait+1 < Ait;
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Hence, the expected market value of the rm by the manager, having taken
into account of the probability  of delaying rating changes, is:
Et
ADi;t+1Xit; Zit = Ait + ID (Xit; Zit) Ait+1
The expected market value of rm i by the uninformed public investor is:
Et
ADi;t+1Xit  Ait + bIDt+1 (Xit) Ait+1:
Therefore the di¤erence in the expected market value of the rm, VDi ;
from the information gap between the rm and the public is:
Et
VDi;t+1Xit; Zit = Et ADi;t+1Xit; Zit  Et ADi;t+1Xit
= 

ID (Xit; Zit)  bIDt+1 (Xit)Ai;t+1 < 0
It is clear therefore that if a rm faces a downgrade, there is overpricing
in the current market value of the rm at time t because of the increased
likelihood of a debt default. In other words, before a downgrade a rm enjoys
potential discrete benet in rm value from the presently higher rating, which
is consistent with the CR-CS theory (see Figure 1, Kisgen 2006). To re-
iterate, our focuses are that managers are concerned about the anticipated
future rating changes, and that managers understand the potential discrete
benet in rm value.
E¤ectively, the rm is in a position to explore mis-pricing by increasing
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debt or equity at time t.9 When a rm faces a downgrade, its decision is
whether to raise equity or debt in order to exploit overpricing. These actions,
however, have costs, and therefore, rms must balance the associated costs
and benets of debt and equity to decide the nancing choice.
We argue that badrms will prefer debt to equity since increasing eq-
uity will have limited benets, but immediate costs. The choice of increas-
ing equity at time t may cause signicant drops in the stock price on the
announcement of an equity issuance (Asquith and Mullins, 1986). This is
because investors are aware of the problem of information asymmetry, and
believe that the rms stock is overvalued when the rm undertakes seasoned
equity o¤erings (Fama and French, 2005).
By using debt nancing before a downgrade, badrms face a risk of
sending the rating further down the line. On the other hand, badrms
can take advantage of the relatively cheaper debt before the downgrade is
realized. The cost of debt capital reects the perceived creditworthiness of
the rm, and badrms may prefer to get the benets of leverage before the
downgrade. Berger, Espinosa-Vega, Frame and Miller (2005) also suggest
that rms with unfavorable private information are willing to pay the costs
on long-term debt. From the above analysis we arrive at our hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 : Badrms prefer to increase debt before a credit rating
downgrade.
9In general, debt nancing benets rms by lowering the weighted average cost of
capital. Korteweg (2010) provides evidence for the net benets to leverage.
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Specically, the hypothesis states that: The relation between the change
in debt 4deti;t and the information gap, GDi;t+1; for a rm who anticipates
a downgrade is positive, i.e., 4deti;t = g
 
GDi;t+1

, g0 > 0. Notice that a test
of this hypothesis is a joint test of  > 0 and g0 > 0:
If the results indicate that 4deti;t is not related to GDi;t+1, it will be a
result of either  = 0; which suggests that the rm does not have insider
information, and/or (g0 = 0), which suggests that the rm does not take
action according to our hypothesis.
3. Data and sample
We collect quarterly data of rm nancial and monthly Standard & Poor
(S&P) ratings data from Compustat, covering more than 30,000 active and
inactive publicly listed rms in the U.S. The sample covers all rms with
quarterly nancial data and at least one rating record during the sample
period from Q1 1985, when the ratings data begin, until Q4 2010. We exclude
rm-quarter observations with negative equity, i.e., leverage greater than
one.10
We further exclude utility companies (SIC 4900-4999) and nancial com-
panies (SIC 6000-6999). Myers (2001) points out that these companies have
a narrow menu of nancing choices and cannot adjust their capital structures
at relatively low costs. In addition, regulations relating to the disclosure poli-
cies of nancial rms are usually stricter than those for non-nancial rms.
10See the appendix for details on the variables we use in the analysis.
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3.1. Summary statistics
We classify a rm-quarter as a downgradewhen the rm gets downgraded
in the next quarter. Panels A and B of Table 1 show, respectively, summary
statistics for the no-downgrade sample, which contains 120,884 rm-quarter
observations, and the downgrade sample, which contains 1,376 rm-quarter
observations.11 The downgraded rms, compared to rms whose ratings are
not downgraded, have much higher leverage ratios (50.6% versus 23.5%),
lower liquidity (7.5% versus 19.2%), lower Growth (Market-to-Book ratio)
(1.09 versus 1.85), and hold more xed assets (37.8% versus 26.5%). All of
these point to deteriorating nancial conditions of the downgraded rms.
These results are consistent with the ndings in the capital structure
literature that companies with relatively safe and tangible assets tend to
borrow more than companies with risky and intangible assets since intangible
assets are more likely to encounter losses under nancial distress (see, Myers
1984, and Frank and Goyal 2003). The downgraded rms also have higher
average Size (the log of sales), which is consistent with the notion that large
companies tend to borrow more than small rms (see, Myers, 2001, and
Frank and Goyal, 2003). Interestingly, in terms of nancing activities, the
downgraded rms, on average, raise more debt (normalized by total assets)
than those rms whose ratings are not downgraded (3.7% versus 0.6%).
11Applying further restrictions on selecting downgraded rms such as those who are
downgraded more than once or downgraded by more than one notch may result in very
sample size, which undermines robust statistical analysis.
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[Insert Table 1 here]
4. Estimation results of the information gap model
As outsiders do not possess insider information Zit; they estimate the logit
model for the probability of a credit rating downgrade as in equation 4 for
[LTD
D
i;t+1: From the view point of insiders (either the rm manager or the
rating agency), however, the outsidersestimation su¤ers from an omitted
variable (Zit) bias. Thus, the statistical signicance of the coe¢ cient esti-
mates are biased from the view point of those who possess insider information.
Table 2 reports the results of estimating credit rating downgrades in a logit
model. Firms with high leverage levels tend to be more likely to get credit
rating downgrades, while protable rms are less likely to be downgraded.
For the rm action variables, an increase in debt to total assets i.e. 4deti;t;
increases the probability of long-term rating downgrades. On the other hand,
an increase in equity to total assets, i.e. 4eqti;t; decreases the probability of
long-term rating downgrades, albeit statistically insignicant.
The quarter-end stock price, which reects investorsinformation of the
rm available to the market by the time of rm capital structure activities.
In utilizing such price information, we allow the exibility that investors
are able to gather signal about the nancial health of the rm. The result
shows an intuitive pattern that higher stock price is associated with a lower
probability of a credit rating downgrade.
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[Insert Table 2 here]
Next, we analyze the information gap between the insiders and outsiders.
The insiders know with certainty about the future rating changes, and hence
do not need to estimate the logit model as the outsiders do. Table 3 shows
that, for those rms whose ratings are not downgraded, outsiders who use
the logit model are nearly 99% correct in predicting no downgrades. More
interestingly, for those rms whose ratings are actually downgraded, outsiders
are only 4.1% correct in predicting downgrades, while nearly 96% will fail
to predict downgrades. These results suggest a potentially large information
gap.
[Insert Table 3 here]
4.1. Modeling of debt and equity changes due to an information gap
To investigate rm behavior due to the information gap, we run regressions as
in equations 7, 8 and 9 of the change in debt, equity and net debt, normalized
by total assets, on the information gaps in rating changes and rm-level
control variables. The rating changes take place in quarter t+ 1:We test the
e¤ects one quarter before (in quarter t) and in the same quarter of rating
changes (at time t+ 1):
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4deti;t+ = 0+1GLTDDi;t+1 + cXi;t+ 1 + "i;t+ ; (7)
4eqti;t+ = 0+1GLTDDi;t+1 + cXi;t+ 1 + "i;t+ (8)
4neti;t+ = 0+1GLTDDi;t+1 + cXi;t+ 1 + "i;t+ (9)
where  =(0; 1),  = 0 for one quarter before rating changes, and  = 1 for
the same quarter of rating changes. The coe¢ cients 1, 1 and 1 capture,
respectively, the e¤ects of adjustments in debt, equity and net debt (debt
minus equity) to the information gap pertaining to a long-term credit rating
downgrade in quarter t + 1. The vector of Xi;t+ 1 represents the control
variables. We control for both the industry and quarter xed e¤ects, and also
obtain clustered standard errors using the approach of Peterson (2009).12 We
obtain the variablesGLTDDi;t+1 from equation (6), having estimated LTD
D
i;t+1
using equation (3) as reported earlier. The e¤ect we are estimating is the
statistical and economic signicance of the information gap GLTDDi;t+1 on
the left-hand-side variables between the downgraded and non-downgraded
rms.
Our Hypothesis states that badrms prefer to take advantage of the
overvalued debt before a rating downgrade. Hence, it predicts a signicantly
positive 1 in equation (7), an insignicant  in equation (8), and a signi-
12We thank John McInnis for his SAS code of the clus-
tered standard errors adjustment, which is available at:
http://www.bhwang.com/a_research/z_codes/Clustering%20%28Code%29.txt
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cantly positive 1 in equation (9) when  = 0.
We now take a close scrutiny on the use of long-term and short-term
nancing to understand the ways rms apply when they anticipate rating
changes. To this end, we run the following regressions (eqs. 10 and 11) using
the dependent variables dened in Section 3.: the ratio of the current period
short-term debt change to previous period total assets, Sdeti;t, and the
ratio of the current period long-term debt change to previous period total
assets, Ldeti;t.
4Sdeti;t+ = S0 + S1GLTDUi;t+1 + S2GLTDDi;t+1 + ScXi;t+ 1+"i;t+ (10)
4Ldeti;t+ = L0 + L1GLTDUi;t+1 + L2GLTDDi;t+1 + LcXi;t+ 1+"i;t+ (11)
where  =(0; 1):
5. Estimation results of debt and equity changes
5.1. One quarter before rating changes
Table 4 reports the estimation results for debt nancing one quarter be-
fore changes in long-term credit ratings. In line with our Hypothesis the
information gap for a long-term credit rating downgrade GLTDDi;t+1 has a
positive coe¢ cient of 1.29% (t = 5.33) to changes in debt. Interestingly,
equity nancing eqti;t, in the second column, is not signicantly associated
with the rating downgrade variable (t = 0.02). The increase in net debt,
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in the third column, is 1.27% (t = 2.38). This evidence suggests that bad
rms embark on more net debt before the anticipated rating downgrade is
materialized. Notice that when our results would be driven by a reversed
causality argument, then we would expect similar e¤ects of debt issues and
stock repurchases on credit rating adjustments, and this is not what we nd.
[Insert Table 4 here]
The coe¢ cient estimates for the control variables in Table 4 are consistent
with the ndings in the literature in both the sign and statistical signicance.
The negative coe¢ cient of leverage (-0.0134, t = -11.04) indicates that Lever-
age in the previous quarter has a signicantly negative e¤ect on debt change
in the current quarter, i.e., rms with higher leverage ratios raise less debt.
The negative coe¢ cient of Liquidity (-0.0175, t = -11.96) indicates that rm
with cash and short-term investment opportunities choose to nance less by
debt. Prot is negatively related to equity change (-0.154, t = -66.95). These
results are consistent with the notion that protable rms have more internal
nancing resources available (Myers, 2001).
Consistent with the nding of Dittmar and Thakor (2007) that rms with
retained earnings tend to nance projects internally, Retained earnings shows
negative and statistically signicant coe¢ cients for the changes in debt and
equity. Firms holding valuable growth opportunities tend to increase equity
nancing (0.0014, t = 25.2) but not debt nancing (coe¢ cient value is virtu-
ally zero) (see also Myers 1984, and Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Tangibility
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is positively related to both debt and equity changes. NDTS is negatively
related to both debt change (-0.0264, t = -3.25) (see also, DeAngelo and Ma-
sulis 1980, and Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim 1984), and equity change (-0.0623,
t = -3.88).
In terms of the long-term and short-term debt mix, as reported in columns
4 and 5 of Table 4, the loading of the information gap variable GLTDDi;t+1
is positive and statistically signicant when explaining changes in long term
debt, while short-term debt does not respond to the information gap. This
indicates that badrms mainly raise long-term debt before a downgrade of
their long-term credit rating.
Overall, our ndings suggest that rms that will be downgraded tend to
take advantage of their currently higher credit rating. In line with Berger,
Espinosa-Vega, Frame and Miller (2005), rms with unfavorable private in-
formation are willing to pay the costs on long-term debt.
5.2. The same quarter as rating changes
Because rms could potentially raise debt one day before an announced down-
grade, we also examine the relation between downgrades and capital structure
changes in the same quarter. Table 5 reports rmsnancing behavior in the
same quarter of rating changes, and conrms our earlier ndings that bad
rms signicantly increase debt. Badrms also do not signicantly increase
equity in the same quarter of the downgrade, which is similar to the insignif-
icant equity increase in the quarter before a downgrade, as reported in Table
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4. Note though that the capital structure change in Table 5 could also occur
right after a downgrade (while still in the same quarter) and issuing equity
could be attempts to increase the rms creditworthiness (see also Kisgen,
2009).
[Insert Table 5 here]
We further nd that, in the same quarter when the news of a downgrade
in the long-term credit rating is announced, the increase of total debt of bad
rms rests on long-term debt increases 3.76% (t = 15.47). Again, this nding
suggests that badrms take advantage of the relatively cheaper long-term
debt before downgrades.
5.3. Investment-grade and speculative-grade firms
We further nd that rms actions with respect to the anticipated rating
changes di¤er across rating categories. In particular, speculative-grade rms
appear to be more responsive in adjusting debt than investment-grade rms.
Specically, we estimate equations 7, 8 and 9 for two sub-samples: rms with
S&P investment-grades (BBB and above) and rms with S&P speculative-
grades (below BBB) according to the S&P domestic long-term issuer credit
rating at time t+ 1 (the quarter when the rating change is announced).
Columns 6 and 7 of Table 4 and 5 show that before a downgrade bad
rms in the speculative-grade spectrum increase debt to utilize the informa-
tion gap. The e¤ect is weaker for rms with investment-grade debt ratings.
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These ndings suggest that speculative-grade rms are keener to take ad-
vantage of the information gap than investment-grade rms, which is in line
with changes in credit ratings being more important for speculative-grade
rms, for example because lower ratings reduce the number of bond portfolio
managers that are allowed to invest in the bonds (Grinblatt and Titman,
2002). Intuitively, the information gap between the lower-rated rms and
outsiders is greater than that of the higher-rated rms, as for instance, fewer
analysts tend to follow lower-rated rms (Chung, 2000).
6. Conclusions
We investigate the impact of information asymmetry between rms and in-
vestors, created by the delay in the arrival of credit rating changes, upon
rmsnancing changes. Relative to public investors, rm managers and
rating agencies possess more precise and up-to-date knowledge and predic-
tions on the rms next-period ratings. This paper asks whether the superior
information of the rms allows them to adjust their nancing activities before
the news of rating changes is publicly disseminated.
We construct a measure of the information gap between rms and in-
vestors concerning rating downgrades in the next quarter. We present a
model in which outsiders predict rm rating changes based on the rms ac-
tions and all other publicly available information. Our framework therefore
explicitly accommodates the ability of outsiders to infer the change in the
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rm ratings by observing the rms actions on capital structure changes. The
information gap is thus dened as the di¤erence between the actual and the
forecasted rating changes. We then model the relation between the rms -
nancing adjustments before a downgrade and our measure of the information
gap, controlling for a set of conventional rm variables.
Our results indicate that rms take advantage of the information asym-
metry and change their nancing accordingly. We nd that rms raise extra
debt in the quarter before a downgrade on the long-term credit rating, consis-
tent with our hypothesis that rms take advantage of the relatively cheaper
debt before downgrades. Further, the downgraded rms do not decrease
equity before downgrades, which is evidence against a reversed causality ar-
gument.
The evidence suggests that the information gap on credit ratings between
rms and the market exists, and also that rms take advantage of the infor-
mation gap by changing their capital structures. Our ndings have important
implications for policy makers in that tightening the requirements for rat-
ing agencies to provide timely updates on their rating outputs will reduce
asymmetric information and will be benecial for public investors and other
stakeholders.
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Appendix:
6.1. Firm action variables
In our analysis we examine the e¤ects on changes in debt, equity and net debt
for rm i in quarter t dened as follows:
4deti;t = Di;tAi;t 1 : debt change, where Di;t is long-term debt increase
(Compustat DLTISY)13 minus long-term debt reduction (Compustat DL-
TRY) plus the change in current debt (Compustat DLCCHY) for rm i in
quarter t, and Ai;t 1 is total asset (Compustat ATQ) of rm i in quarter
t  1.
4eqti;t = Ei;tAi;t 1 : equity change, where Ei;t is the sale of common and
preferred stock (Compustat SSTKY) minus purchases of common and pre-
ferred stock (Compustat PRSTKCY) for rm i in quarter t.
We also analyze net debt change (as in Kisgen (2006)) as the di¤erence
between deti;t and eqti;t , dened as neti;t =
Di;t Ei;t
Ai;t 1
.
We further look into details of debt changes by examining the e¤ects on
short term and long-term debt, respectively.
4Sdeti;t = 4SDi;tAi;t 1 , where 4SDi;t is the change in current debt (Compu-
stat DLCCHY) for rm i in quarter t.
13The last letter Yin DLTISY indicates that the variable is year-to-date. We derive
quarterly values of observations for all variables using the year-to-date data.
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4Ldeti;t = 4LDi;tAi;t 1 , where 4LDi;t is the long-term debt increase (Compu-
stat DLTISY) minus long-term debt reduction (Compustat DLTRY) for rm
i in quarter t.
6.2. State variables
We include the control variables (Xi;t) which are conventionally considered in
capital structure studies including: Leverage, Size, Price, Liquidity, Prot,
Earnings, Growth, Tangibility and Non-Debt Tax Shields (NDTS) to sep-
arate their inuences from the role of information gap on rmsnancing
activities.14
Leveragei;t : the ratio of the sum of short-term debt (Sdet) (Compustat
DLCQ) and long-term debt (Ldet) (Compustat DLTTQ) to the sum of short-
term debt, long-term debt and stockholdersequity (Compust LSEQ minus
LTQ) for rm i in quarter t.
Sizei;t: the logarithm of sales (Compustat SALEQ) for rm i in quarter
t.
Pricei;t: the logarithm of the stocks quarterly closing price in the quarter
(Compustat PRCCQ) for rm i in quarter t.
Liquidityi;t: the ratio of cash and cash equivalent (Compustat CHEQ) to
total assets (Compustat ATQ) for rm i in quarter t.
Profiti;t: the ratio of EBITDA to total assets (Compustat ATQ) for rm
14Kisgen (2006) shows signicant negative relations between leverage and debt nancing.
Titman and Wessels (1988) show that rm size, as indicated by the logarithm of sales,
is one of the crucial determinants of capital structure. Marsh (1982) shows that changes
in security prices alter debt/equity ratios. Myers (2001) and Fama and French (2002)
demonstrate that prot is an important factor that a¤ects capital structure. Market-to-
book ratio (dened as growth in our study) and tangibility are variables a¤ecting leverage
ratio in Rajan and Zingales (1995). Dividends and earnings policies relate tightly to the
increase of debt and equity sale (Titman and Wessels, 1988). We include liquidity (see
Kim, Mauer and Sherman, 1998) to control for possible impacts on leverage from rms
cash positions and non-debt tax shields (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980, and Bradley, Jarrell
and Kim, 1984).
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i in quarter t.15
Earningsi;t: the ratio of retained earnings (Compustat REQ) to total
assets (Compustat ATQ) for rm i in quarter t.
Growthi;t: the ratio of total book value of debt plus quarterly close price
(Compustat PRCCQ) times the number of common stock shares outstanding
(Compustat CSHOQ) to total asset (Compustat ATQ) for rm i in quarter
t.
Tangibilityi;t: the ratio of (net) property plant and equipment (Compu-
stat PPENTQ) to total asset (Compustat ATQ) for rm i in quarter t.
NDTSi;t: the ratio of deferred taxes and investment tax credit (Com-
pustat TXDITCQ) to total assets (Compustat ATQ) for rm i in quarter
t.
6.3. Forecasting rating changes
We estimate a logit model by regressing two distinct categories: downgrades
and others(no rating change or upgrades) of S&P Long Term Rating (oth-
ersis the reference category) on independent variables as re-written below:
LTDDi;t+1 = I
D(Xi;t) (12)
LTDDi;t+1 =
(
1; SPLT i;t+1 < SPLT i;t
0; SPLT i;t+1  SPLT i;t
t = 1; 2; : : : ; 47; where LTDDi;t+1 is the response variable that indicates the
rating change choice made by the rating agency. The state variables are
conventionally considered in capital structure studies including: Leverage,
Size, Price, Liquidity, Prot, Earnings, Growth, Tangibility and non-debt
tax shields (NDTS) (see also, Ederington and Yawitz, 1986), including rm
15EBITDAi;t is the earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization for rm
i at time t, which is calculated as the sum of pretax income (Compustat PIQ), interest
expense (Compustat TIEQ) and depreciation and amortization (Compustat DPQ).
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action variables: 4deti;t and 4eqti;t.
The predicted rating downgrade probability [LTD
D
i;t+1 for rm i in quarter
t+ 1 is given by:
[LTD
D
i;t+1 = Prob
 
LTDDi;t+1 = 1

=
exp(X0i;tb)
1 + exp(X0i;tb) (13)
The standard interpretation of the logit model is that for a one unit
change in the predictor variables, the outcome relative to the reference group
is expected to change by its respective parameter estimation given that other
variables in the model are unchanged.
The estimation of (12) shows that the probability of downgrade [LTD
D
i;t+1
is decreasing with protability. The p-values from goodness of t test shows
that the model is a good t for the data overall.
For long-term credit ratings, 1.17% of the observations are downgrades.
Thus, downgrades are rare events, and the predictors could su¤er from small
sample bias. Therefore we use the King and Zeng (2001) rare events small
sample correction method for a binomial logistic model. This improves the
predictability of the probabilities.
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